WHAT ABOUT THE PRIORS?
Are the minimizing priors "palatable"? If not, what then? The one-point prior most favorable to H1 is clearly an exaggeration, but more palatable for one-sided than two-sided alternatives, as EL&S noted. The symmetric two-point prior is still worse for one-sided but somewhat better for two-sided alternatives. EL&S chose accordingly; their remark that one-point priors for one-sided alternatives are "little different" is borne out by halving the P values in B&S's Table 4 and comparing the result with Table 5 (or 2), most easily via the last column unless p = .05. All of the minimizing priors depend on the data, an unpalatable feature to most who care at all, and real opinions in one-sided problems would rarely be symmetric or improper. So real prior opinions will often be far from the minimizing opinions, which suggests that real posterior opinions may greatly exceed the lower bounds. This strengthens B&S's main point [because restricting the prior further can only increase the amount by which Pr(Ho I x) exceeds p in the two-sided case], but points up the weakness of C&B's results in the one-sided case (where matters were already left indeterminate by their argument).
Unfortunately, to discredit a seriously entertained point null hypothesis, one needs something like a lower bound on the prior density in the region of maximum likelihood under the alternative. This appears directly in EL&S but only indirectly in B&S (Comment 3). To my mind it justifies EL&S in being even more cautious in their conclusion (quoted previously) than B&S in Comment 1. Any dimension-reducing hypothesis poses a similar troubling problem. Making such hypotheses approximate makes them more realistic but harder yet to analyze. Comment 1. J. GOOD* I was interested in both of these articles (which I shall call B&S and C&B) because Bayesian aspects of P values have fascinated me for more than 40 years. The topic will be taken more seriously now that it has hit JASA with two long articles, plus discussion, and the occasion will be all the easier to remember because two Bergers are involved. One result, I hope, will be that the conventional * I. J. Good is University Distinguished Professor, Department of Statistics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061. This work was supported in part by National Institutes of Health Grant GM18770. P value of approximately .05, when testing a simple statistical hypothesis Ho, will be correctly interpreted: not as a good reason for rejecting Ho but as a reason for obtaining more evidence provided that the original experiment was worth doing in the first place.
WHAT'S IT
In my opinion P values and Bayes factors are both here to stay, so the relationships between them need to be taken seriously. These relationships form a large part of the main problem of pure rationality, namely to what extent Bayesian and non-Bayesian methods can be synthesized. (The main problem of applied rationality is how to preserve the human species.) My view is that the methods can be synthesized, because, contrary to the opinion of some radical Bayesians, I believe that P values are not entirely without merit. The articles by B&S and C&B contribute to this synthesis, although the title of B&S might suggest otherwise.
The relationships between P values and Bayes factors depend on the specific problem, on the background information (some of which is usually vague), on the sample size, on the model assumed, Bayesian or otherwise, and on the questions being asked. B&S and C&B consider distinct questions and, therefore, arrive at distinct solutions. Their problems can be described as significance testing and discrimination, respectively. I think that the article by C&B would have been improved if it had been slightly more friendly to B&S. Television commercials compare burgers, but they do not knock the simple statistical hypothesis. Both articles make useful contributions by careful considerations of inequalities satisfied by Bayes factors. My comments will be partly historical.
Sometimes it is adequate, as in B&S, to define a null hypothesis as 0 = 0 or as 101 < s, where s is small [compare, e.g., Good 1950, p. 91] ; sometimes (and this can be regarded as a generalization of the first case) the null hypothesis asserts that 0 -0 with one or more priors conditional on this inequality; sometimes the initial or prior probability Pr(H0) is (approximately) equal to 2 as is usually assumed in both of the articles under discussion and by Jeffreys (1939) ; sometimes Pr(HO) is far from 2 (and of course the posterior probability of Ho can, therefore, be arbitrarily smaller than a P value); sometimes we prefer to leave the estimation of Pr(H0) to posterity and, therefore, try to summarize the evidence from the experimental outcome alone by a P value or by a Bayes factor (or by its logarithm the weight of evidence), both of which have the merit of not depending on Pr(H0); and sometimes the priors conditioned on Ho and on its negation H1 are reasonably taken as "mirror reflections" in the origin, as is largely assumed by C&B. When testing a treatment that a scientist had previously claimed to be better than a standard one, we are apt to choose Ho as 0 = 0 and H1 as 0 > 0. This model shows more respect to the scientist than if we defined Ho as 0 -0 or H1 as 0 $ 0. Whether he deserves that much respect will again depend on circumstances.
Although the two articles deal with distinct problems, it is possible to produce models that include both problems and intermediate ones. I have worked out one such concrete example that more or less does this and that I shall describe briefly. For more details see Good (in press a). It is a special case of C&B (4.1), but I believe that it is general enough for most purposes.
Let X denote the mean of n random variables, iid, and each N(O, a2), where a2 iS known or well estimated from the sample. Our aim is to discriminate between Ho: 0 S 0 and H1 : 0 > 0.
Assume that the prior density of 0 given Hi (i = 0 or 1) is the folded normal density 
where 0 denotes odds (also sometimes called an odds ratio), G denotes what was given before X was observed, the colon is read "provided by the information that," the vertical stroke denotes "given" as usual, and
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where co = 1, e = -1, u2 = o2/n is the variance of X, and 0 is the error function The integrand in (4) is smooth and not difficult to calculate, so the Bayes factor can be presented as a program with six input parameters, x, Un, ao, a,, AO, and Al, and the user can try several priors. The result contains several interesting special cases, including some results given by B&S and C&B, except that the Bayes factor of B&S will be one half of mine in the appropriate special case. (See my miscellaneous comment 2 below.)
For example, if we take AO = Al = 0, ao = a1 = -, r/ un large, and Pr(HO) = 2, and let H2 denote the hypothesis that 0 = 0, then Pr(HO I X = x) q' O(xIan) = P, the single-tailed P value corresponding to the "null hypothesis" H2. Note that H2 is not Ho. We may also describe P as the maximum P value over all simple statistical hypotheses of the form 0 = 00, where 00 -0 as in C&B. Because H2 is not Ho this case provides only a partial reconciliation of Bayesian and Fisherian methods, especially as it is only one of many possible cases, and for this reason I think that C&B have exaggerated. The result certainly does not, and C&B do not claim that it does, justify the extraordinarily common error, mentioned in both articles, perpetrated by several reputable scientists ("nonspecialists," to quote B&S), of interpreting a P value as Pr(HO I X = x) even when Ho is a point hypothesis.
When I mentioned the prevalence of this error to Jim Dickey he pointed out that even Neyman had perpetrated it! [See Good (1984a) .] (Most of my citations from now on will be to papers of which I have read every word.)
When ao = 0, Al = 0 (so c1 = pu1), allIn is "large," and x > 2an, we have the situation of B&S (Th. 2, apart from a factor of 2), and the Bayes factor against Ho is approximately 
by Laplace's continued fraction. [Compare Good (1967, p. 410 ).] Since s is a function of P, it follows that, for a given value of P, the Bayes factor against Ho is proportional to n-1/2, and this is usually true when Ho is a simple statistical hypothesis. This may be called the root n effect and was perhaps first noticed by Jeffreys (1939, pp. 194 and 361-364) . For some history of this and allied topics, see Good (1982a) . As a special case of (7) one could append a further column to Table 4 The root n effect is closely related to the familiar "paradox," mentioned by C&B, that a tail-area pundit can cheat by optional stopping. This possibility is also implicit in Good (1950, p. 96) and was made crystal-clear by reference to the law of the iterated logarithm in Good (1955 Good ( / 1956 . This form of optional stopping is known as "sampling to a foregone conclusion." To prevent this form of cheating, and to justify to some extent the use of P values as measures of evidence, I proposed "standardizing" a tail-area probability P to sample size 100, by replacing P by min(A, n"12 P/10) (Good 1982b ). This proposal is an example of a Bayes/non-Bayes (or Bayes-Fisher) compromise, or "synthesis" as it was called by Good (1957, p. 862) and in lectures at Princeton University in 1955. An example for a multinomial problem was previously given by Good (1950, pp. 95-96) . For other examples of the Bayes/non-Bayes synthesis see, for example, Good (in press b) .
In most situations that I have seen, where one tests a point null hypothesis, the sample size n lies between 20 and 500, so if we think in terms of n = 100, the square root effect will not mislead us by more than a factor of \/5 in either direction. This explains why I have found that a Bayes factor B ' against a point null hypothesis on a given occasion is roughly inversely proportional to P. This leads to the useful harmonic-mean rule of thumb for combining "tests in parallel," that is, tests on the same data (Good 1958 (Good , 1984b . This rule of thumb is not precise, but it is much better than the dishonest precise procedure of selecting the test that best supports what you want to believe! Miscellaneous comments. 1. B&S rightly emphasize the distinction between knowing that P = P0 (or only just less) and knowing only that P -P0. The latter statement is of course "unfair" to the null hypothesis when P is close to P0 (Good 1950, p. 94) . If a scientist reports only that P < .05 we are sometimes left wondering whether P .049, in which case the scientist may have been deliberately misleading. Such a scientist might have been brought up not to tell fibs, without being told that a flam is usually worse than a fib. Or perhaps he was just brainwashed by an "official" NeymanPearson philosophy in an elementary textbook written with the help of a pair of scissors and a pot of glue and more dogmatic than either Neyman or Egon Pearson were. If Neyman had been dogmatic he would not have made the "nonspecialist's error," or error of the third kind, mentioned previously.
2. In the past, and frequently in conversation, I have used a rough rule that a P value of .05 is worth a Bayes factor of only about 4 when testing a simple statistical hypothesis (e.g., Good 1950, p. 94; 1983, p. 51) . B&S get about half this value because they use a prior symmetric about 0 = 0 given H1, whereas my rule is intended more for the case in which H1 asserts that 0 > 0.
3. The topic of max factors, mentioned by B&S, without the cosmetic name, was also discussed in Good (1950, p. 91 ) as applied to multinomials, which of course includes binomials, and where the maximum weight of evidence (log-factor) is related to the chi-squared test. In the binomial case, the approximation given for the maximum weight of evidence (in "natural bans") again Ho naturally agrees with the result It2 cited in Example 1 of B&S. Although in multivariate problems the max factor is much too large, the relationship to x2 shows the relevance to an aspect of the philosophy of the Bayes/non-Bayes or Bayes-Fisher synthesis, namely that even a poor Bayesian model can lead to a sensible non-Bayesian criterion (a point that I have made on several other occasions).
Sometimes a multivariate test can be reduced to a univariate one. B&S mention an example, and another example is that of a max factor that is useful because the maximization is over a single hyperparameter as in the mixed Dirichlet hierarchical Bayes approach to multinomials and contingency tables (e.g., Good 1976 Good , p. 1170 Good and Crook 1974, p. 714) .
4. In their concluding comments B&S state that when considering a simple statistical hypothesis Ho, by and large 2a is weak evidence against Ho, 3a is "significant," and so on. These conclusions agree roughly with Good (1957, p. 863) , where I judged that the Bayes factor in favor of Ho usually lies within a factor of 3 of lOP. (This can break down if P < 1/10,000 and for very large sample sizes.)
5. The references in B&S cover much of the literature, and this will presumably be more true when the comments
